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CONTEMPT

Court has incorporated the Cooke dictum into a
procedure for dealing with disruptive contumacious
defendants. Yet the Mayberry decision did not
solve some of the problems that plague the law of
contempt, such as the possible constitutional requirement of a jury trial or the excessive length of
contempt penalties. In fact, Mayberry did not
even confront some of the difficulties inherent
within its own peculiar fact situation, such as de-

[Vol. 62

fendants who repeatedly assault any judge in any
judicial proceeding and whether warning needs to
be given during the trial after contumacious outbursts. Although the "arsenal of authority" in
Allen provides other alternatives for trial judges
dealing with disruptive defendants, courts which
face situations similiar to Mayberry have not been
provided clear guidelines for correctly controlling
a contumacious defendant.

RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITy

The Seventh Circuit in In re Korman, __F.2d-.
(7th Cir. 1971), concluded that a defendant
granted immunity while testifying before a federal
grand jury is entitled to "transactional" immunity
from prosecution of any crimes related to his testimony. In reaching this decision, the court held that
the new federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002,
was unconstitutional because it encroached upon
the rights guaranteed to the defendant by the
fifth amendment by providing "use" immunity
1
only.
The case arose from a grand jury investigation
in which the defendant was cited for contempt
because he refused to testify despite government
offers of immunity. The defendant remained silent,
contending that the immunity provision in § 6002
did not sufficiently protect him from prosecution
to conform to the requirements of the fifth amendment. Agreeing with the defendant's argument,
the court cited Counselman v. Hitchcock,2 where the
Supreme Court rejected a statute that provided
only "use" immunity.
On appeal, the government argued that Counselman was overruled sub silentio by Murphy v. New
1 18 U.S.C. § 6002, effective October 15, 1970, was a
part of the Organized Crime Act of 1970, which repealed all of the existing immunity provisions in the
federal criminal code. The statute permits federal
grand juries, federal district courts, and many administrative agencies to offer only "use" immunity to
witnesses. "Use" immunity forbids either the use of
the testimony or the fruits of the testimony to be used
against the witness in a criminal prosecution. However, if the prosecution can show an independent
source of information, then the witness can be prosecuted for the crime connected to his testimony. Adopting "use" immunity as opposed to transactional immunity was the clear intention of Congress. H. R. REP.
No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (1970).
2 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

York Waterfront Commission,3 where the defendant
was granted immunity from state prosecution to
testify before a state board of commissioners. Although concluding that the New York immunity
provision foreclosed any federal "use" of either
the testimony or the fruits of the testimony, the
Murphy majority implied, nevertheless, that
Counselman supported the premise that "use"
immunity complied with the fifth amendment.
This implication was recently followed by Stewart
v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), in
4
holding that 18 U.S.C. § 6002 was constitutional.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Stewart, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the Murphy
implication as dicta since the primary issue there
was whether state immunity statutes were applicable to federal prosecutors as well as state officials.
Moreover, the court of appeals noted that Counselman has been reffirmed since Murphy as the leading authority for the rejection of "use" immunity
as unconstitutional. 5 The court therefore concluded that Counselman, as applied to the facts in
the instant case, compelled the result of reversing
the defendant's sentence and held 18 U.S.C. § 6002
unconstitutional.
3 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
'The facts in Stewart paralleled the facts in Korman.
In both cases, a witness refused to testify before a
federal grand jury and was subsequently cited for
contempt.
'See PiciriUlo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971);
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
382 U.S. 70 (1965). In Pkirillo,the majority dismissed
certiorari as improvidently granted because the New
York Court of Appeals had since reversed itself and
held that transactional immunity was constitutionally
compelled. Justice Brennan, dissenting, felt that the
Court should have heard the case and that if it had,
the proper decision would have been to reject "use"
immunity as unconstitutional on the basis of Counselman.

RECENT TRENDS.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), the Supreme Court rearticulated the plainview exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement. In the past, the exception validated
warrantless search and seizure of items in plain
view. Coolidge required in addition that the item
be come upon "inadvertently." Thus a prior
knowledge of an item's location together with the intention to seize it ruled out possible "inadvertency"
and required the authorization of a search warrant.
In United States v. Welsch, 9 BNA Crim. L.
Rptr. 2453 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 1971), the Tenth
Circuit ruled that the plain-view doctrine was
satisfied where no appreciable time passed between
the formation of prior knowledge and intent to
seize, and actual seizure. In Welsch an F.B.I. agent,
posing as a chemist, was called by another agent,
posing as a prospective drug buyer, to test sample
tablets produced by the defendant from a suitcase
under his motel room bed. The "chemist" assured
the defendant that he would return within twenty
minutes. After conducting a field test for the presence of LSD and mescaline, he returned, the defendant was arrested, and the suitcase was seized.
The court observed that the agents had insufficient
time for both testing the sample and securing an
arrest or search warrant. The court interpreted the
Coolidge Court's reference to an "intention to
seize" as meaning the "pre-existing knowledge of
the identity and location of an item sufficiently in
advance of the seizure to permit the warrant to be
applied for and issued." Since there was no such
time interval in Welsch, the court held the seized
items as having come within "constructive" plain
view, and held the seizure not inconsistent with
the Coolidge inadvertency doctrine.
PRIsONERs RIGHTS

In Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971), the court of appeals provided the most exhaustive analysis yet on the increasingly controversial subject of prisoners' rights. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1983, prison inmate Sostre sought injunctive and
monetary relief for deprivation of his constitutional rights. He alleged that he was placed in
solitary confinement without due process of law,
that his solitary confinement for over a year constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that
he was being punished for his political beliefs and
legal activities.' The district court granted the
ISostre v. McGinnis, 312 F. Supp. 863, 870-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).

plaintiff his requested relief, including $13,020 in
monetary damages
On appeal the Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
upheld the district court's ruling that prisoner
Sostre was denied due process of law when he was
placed in solitary confinement without any administrative proceeding.8 The court of appeals
further agreed with the district court that the
plaintiff had the right to communicate with both
his lawyer and a co-defendant with respect to
legal matters as well as the right to possess literature concerning his own political beliefs. 9 The
court of appeals refused, however, to sustain the
district court's finding that solitary confinement
for over a year constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.10 The court noted that the plaintiff
was afforded the opportunity both to exercise and
to communicate with fellow prisoners during his
solitary confinement but refused to do so. In
light of this refusal, the court did not find the
conditions of Sostre's confinement so "barbarous"
or "shocking to the conscience" as to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation." Finally,
although the court of appeals agreed that § 1983
permitted a monetary award, the court refused
to uphold the district court's relief under the facts
2
of the case
In Holt v. Sarver, 442 F. 2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971),
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
"that imprisonment of inmates at the Cummins
and Tucker units [of the Arkansas prison system]
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative
of the Eighth Amendment ....
3 The court,
agreeing with the Second Circuit's narrow standard for cruel and unusual punishment, found the
conditions of the entire Arkansas prison system
to be so "barbarous" as to violate the Eighth
4
Amendment rights of the inmates.
7 Id. at 886.

8 Although the court disagreed that due process
required all the procedural elements which the district court had insisted upon, the court did maintain
that a prisoner subject to serious disciplinary action
must at the least be "confronted with the accusation,
informed of the evidence against him... and afforded
a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions." 442
F.2d at 201.
9Id. at 202.
10Id. at 193.
11Id. at 191.
12Id. at 205. The warden against whom Sostre had a
valid monetary claim died and the new warden had
not taken part in the decision to place the plaintiff in
solitary confinement.
1"442 F.2d at 308.
4Id.

